

KWANGHYUN KIM

Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
214 David Kinley Hall
1407 W. Gregory Dr.
Urbana, IL 61801

Phone: +1-217-621-6703
Email: kkim134@illinois.edu
<https://sites.google.com/site/kwanghyunkim9/>

EDUCATION

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| University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ph.D. Economics | Expected May 2019 |
| Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) M.S. Management Engineering | 2012 |
| Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) B.S. Management Engineering and Mathematics (double major) | 2010 |

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Auctions, Mechanism Design, Game Theory, Microeconomics

WORKING PAPERS

“First-Price Auctions with Maxmin Expected Utility Bidders” (Job Market Paper)
“An Impossibility Result on Bilateral Trading Mechanisms with Interdependent Values”
“Multilateral Trading Mechanism with Interdependent Values”

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

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| Midwest Economic Theory Conference at Vanderbilt University Paper: “First-Price Auctions with Maxmin Expected Utility Bidders” | Oct 2018 |
| Midwest Economic Theory Conference at Purdue University Paper: “An Impossibility Result on Bilateral Trading Mechanisms with Interdependent Values” | Dec 2016 |

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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| Teaching Assistant, Economic Statistics 1 Led three discussion sections per week. Taught course materials and Excel. | Fall 2013, Fall 2014, Fall 2015 - Spring 2018 |
| Teaching Assistant, Economic Statistics 2 Led three discussion sections per week. Taught course materials. | Spring 2014, Spring 2015 |

HONORS AND AWARDS

List of Teachers Ranked as Excellent by Students
Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Spring 2016, Fall 2016, Spring 2017, Fall 2017, Spring 2018
Summer Research Fellowship 2015

OTHER INFORMATION

Languages: English (fluent), Korean (native), Chinese (basic, HSK Level III)
Technical Skills: MATLAB, R, LaTeX

REFERENCES

Professor Steven Williams (Chair)
Department of Economics
University of Melbourne, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
swillia3@illinois.edu
+61-3-9035-4639

Professor Dan Bernhardt
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
danber@illinois.edu
+1-217-244-5708

Professor Jorge Lemus
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
jalemus@illinois.edu
+1-217-244-7468

Professor Guillermo Marshall
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
gmarshll@illinois.edu
+1-217-300-0945

ABSTRACTS

“First-Price Auctions with Maxmin Expected Utility Bidders” (Job Market Paper)

This paper studies the first price auction with independent private valuations, wherein each bidder faces ambiguity about the probability distribution from which the other bidders' valuations for the item are drawn. Each bidder is ambiguity averse and this ambiguity is represented by a set of priors. In this informational setting, a maxmin Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auction is identified. It is also shown that the bidders' bids and the seller's expected revenue increase as the level of the bidders' ambiguity increases if the bidders' valuation distribution satisfies the monotone inverse hazard rate condition. Finally, the paper shows that the seller's expected revenue from the first price auction is greater than that from the second price auction.

“An Impossibility Result on Bilateral Trading Mechanisms with Interdependent Values”

This paper studies trading mechanisms in which traders' valuations for an indivisible item are interdependent. Trade can occur between one buyer and one seller for an indivisible item. Under the assumption that each trader's information has a greater effect on her own valuation than on the other trader's valuation, no trading mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and ex-post budget balance exist.

“Multilateral Trading Mechanism with Interdependent Values”

This paper studies a trading mechanism in which traders' valuations for an item are interdependent. Trading occurs between multiple buyers and multiple sellers. The transfer rules of the trading mechanism are motivated by the second-price auction. The mechanism satisfies ex-post efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, and ex-post individual rationality. An example in which the mechanism does not satisfy ex-post budget balance is given.